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Abstract
This paper examines the tie between knowledge and behavior in a noun generalization context. An experiment directly comparing noun generalizations of children at the same point in development in forced-choice and yes/no
tasks reveals task-specific differences in the way children’s knowledge of nominal categories is brought to bear in
a moment. To understand the cognitive system that produced these differences, the real-time decision processes in
these tasks were instantiated in a dynamic field model. The model captures both qualitative and quantitative differences in performance across tasks and reveals constraints on the nature of children’s accumulated knowledge. Additional simulations of developmental change in the yes/no task between 2 and 4 years of age illustrate how changes in
children’s representations translate into developmental changes in behavior. Together, the empirical data and model
demonstrate the dynamic nature of knowledge and are consistent with the perspective that knowledge cannot be separated from the task-specific processes that create behavior in the moment.
Keywords: word learning, developmental processes, competence/performance, computational modeling

child possesses some bit of knowledge?
This question comes from a view of cognition that separates knowledge from process. By this view, knowledge resides in the head of the child, waiting to be accessed by the
appropriate stimuli or task. Thus, developmentalists design
tasks to tap into children’s knowledge; if children perform
competently they are said to have the requisite knowledge,
if children fail they are said to lack the knowledge. One
problem with this view is that it pits children’s competence
(i.e., knowledge) against their performance (i.e., behavior).
Consequently, when children fail at a task it can always be
claimed that they have the knowledge, but that the task did
not effectively elicit that knowledge (see Sophian, 1997, and
commentaries for discussion). A second problem with this
view is that it leaves unexplained what is critical for acting
in the world and for the unfolding of developmental process—how knowledge is created and how it is brought to
bear in a task.

1. Introduction
There are numerous examples in the cognitive development literature where children’s abilities appear to
shift across ages and tasks in seemingly paradoxical ways.
For example, studies with young infants suggest that 3and 4-month-old children can use knowledge of physical
laws of continuity and solidity to determine where a ball
rolled down a ramp should stop (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). Yet, when tested in similar paradigms, 2- and 3-year-old children do not seem to have this
same knowledge (Berthier, DeBlois, Poirier, Novak, & Clifton, 2000). Similarly, research suggests that 6- to 8-monthold infants can detect the numerical equivalence between
sets of auditory and visual stimuli (Starkey, Spelke, & Gelman, 1990); yet, 3-year-old children fail at a similar task
(Mix, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 1996). Such examples leave
the field in a difficult position: how are we to know when a
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An alternative and growing view is that knowledge is not
separate from the processes that create behavior in a task.
That is, knowledge is not a unitary thing that can be had,
rather, it is distributed in and across many processes (e.g.
Barsalou, 1999; Plumert, 2008; Port and VanGelder, 1995;
Samuelson and Smith, 2000b; Skarda and Freeman, 1987;
Spencer and Schöner, 2003; Spivey and Dale, 2006; Thelen
and Smith, 1994). By this view, one cannot ask about knowledge independent of the task that brings that knowledge to
bear in a moment in time. Rather, the question to be asked is
how the specifics of the task cohere with the child’s prior history of perceiving, thinking, and acting to create behavior in
the moment.
Direct support for this view in developmental science
comes from work by Esther Thelen, Linda Smith, and their
colleagues showing how infants’ performance in the classic Piagetian A-not-B task is influenced by a host of intrinsic
and extrinsic factors (Clearfield et al., 2006; Diedrich et al.,
2001; Diedrich et al., 2000; Smith et al., 1999; Thelen et al.,
2001; Thelen and Smith, 1997). Although such studies have
contributed foundational support for the idea that knowledge is bound to behavior in a particular task, the implications of this work for cognition more generally have been
called into question given that the A-not-B phenomenon is
largely grounded in sensorimotor activity (Freeman, 2001;
Glenberg et al., 2001; Markman, 2001; Munakata and McClelland, 2003; but see Spencer & Schöner, 2003). An important question, then, is whether this view has implications for
higher-order cognition.
This question is well illustrated by a current debate in the
word learning literature (see Samuelson & Bloom, 2008). In
a typical experimental procedure, a young child shown a
novel solid, rigid object and told a novel name (e.g., “this is
a dax”) will most likely say that only other objects that share
the same shape as the exemplar can be called by the same
name (Imai et al., 1994; Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson and
Smith, 1999). Young children are thus said to show a “shape
bias” when generalizing novel names for solid objects. Importantly, however, children do not always generalize novel
names by shape similarity. Rather, attention to shape and
other object dimensions has been shown to be context, stimulus, and language specific, and thus exquisitely tuned to
the language being learned (see Smith and Samuelson, 2006;
Yoshida and Smith, 2003). Furthermore, recent studies suggest that children who learn to attend to shape when naming novel objects subsequently show accelerated vocabulary
development (Samuelson, 2002; Smith et al., 2002) and that
development of a shape bias is related to the development
of the early noun vocabulary (Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith,
2004; Samuelson and Smith, 1999).
Nevertheless, there has been sharp debate regarding the
origin of the shape bias (Booth and Waxman, 2002; Diesendruck and Bloom, 2003; Smith et al., 2003). At its core, this
debate is about the foundational nature of cognition and
whether knowledge/competence can be separated from
performance (Colunga and Smith, 2008; Samuelson and
Horst, 2008; Smith and Samuelson, 2006). Booth, Waxman,
and Huang (2005), and Bloom and colleagues (Bloom, 2000;
Bloom and Markson, 1998; Diesendruck and Bloom, 2003)
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argue that children’s biased attention to shape reflects their
conceptual understanding that shape is an important indicator of object kind. These arguments stem from a traditional
view of cognition that parses mental activity into discrete
and separable processes of sensing, thinking, and acting.
In contrast, Smith and colleagues argue that the shape bias
is an attentional bias that itself is the developmental product of the child’s exposure to a language in which solidity
and category organization by shape are highly correlated
(Smith, 2000; Smith and Samuelson, 2006). This idea stems
from the view of cognition that sees knowledge as embedded in process and denies a separation between sensing,
thinking, and acting.
Critically, progress in this debate has been hampered by
the fact that little attention has been paid to differences in the
tasks and stimuli used to elicit noun generalizations in studies that purport to support one view over another. In this
way, then, the word learning literature mirrors the larger developmental and cognitive science literatures both in terms
of the existing disagreements concerning the nature of the
cognitive system and in the need for a greater understanding of how the specifics of a task elicit knowledge in a moment. In the present paper, we examine these issues via a
case study that probes similarities and differences in children’s novel noun generalizations for solid and deformable
things and, critically, how these differences depend on the
details of the tasks that are used to elicit those generalizations. We show how an understanding of the processes that
support behavior in a task yield insights into the nature of
developmental changes in knowledge.
Our work is inspired by the view that knowledge is not
separate from the processes that create behavior in a task.
Note that this view does not deny a long-term accumulation of information based on specific experiences with objects and words. As applied to the development of the
shape bias, this view suggests that as children learn individual name–object pairings, they learn a system of regularities between linguistic devices, the structure of object
categories, and perceptual properties (see Smith & Samuelson, 2006). This information accumulates over the development of the early noun vocabulary and is the “knowledge”
children bring to the task of generalizing a novel name
from a novel object to new instances. Thus, when we refer
to “knowledge” we are referring to the child’s accumulated
history of experiencing naming contexts paired with objects
in particular ways.
The critical question is how these prior experiences are
brought to bear in the moment that a child is asked to make
a novel noun generalization. In the current work, we explore this issue by first experimentally examining differences in the way children’s accumulated knowledge of
nominal categories is brought to bear in specific task contexts. We examine the interaction of knowledge with process by submitting the same knowledge to a model that
concretely specifies critical aspects of these processes, and
find that, as in the experiment with children, different behaviors emerge across tasks. Systematic manipulations of
the model parameters that specify the input knowledge and
processes demonstrate that the experimental pattern of re-
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sults only obtains when the inputs are processed in particular ways. This is further illustrated in simulations of developmental changes in novel noun generalization. This
work thus demonstrates that changes to either the input
knowledge alone or the processes alone do not capture differences in children’s behavior across tasks and development—it takes a coherent pattern of change in both to yield
the specific pattern of behavioral change.
1.1. Background: naming deformable things
A bias to attend to shape, although useful for learning
nouns such as table, hammer, and key, that name solid objects
in shape-based categories (Samuelson & Smith, 1999), may
not be appropriate for all nominal categories. In particular,
deformable things such as paper, blankets, and towels provide
an interesting test case for children’s attention to shape because similarity in material may be as important to the organization of these nominal categories as similarity in shape. In
fact, studies with adults suggest deformable things are organized into nominal categories based on similarity of material
(Samuelson and Smith, 1999; Samuelson and Smith, 2000a).
Further, material substance is often critical to what can be
done with these things. For example, while both blankets
and towels are likely to have a rectangular shape, it is their
particular material composition that distinguishes one from
the other and that influences what we do with each. Thus,
children may be biased to generalize novel names for novel
deformable things according to material substance.
On the other hand, many deformable things do have
characteristic shapes (e.g., shirts, pants, and socks) and thus
shape is an important factor in the organization of these
nominal categories. Further, while deformable things can be
folded, balled, squished or otherwise manipulated to alter
their shape, they can be returned to their original shapes following such manipulations. In addition, analysis of the early
noun vocabulary suggests that many of the categories of deformable things that children learn to name early are similar to categories of rigid things in that both are named with
count nouns (“a shirt” rather than “*some shirt”, Samuelson
& Smith, 1999). In the early noun vocabulary, count noun
syntax is associated with categories organized by similarity
in shape (Samuelson & Smith, 1999). It is therefore also possible that the similarity in the syntactic frame associated with
rigid and deformable things may direct children’s attention
to shape when naming deformables (Samuelson et al., 2008;
Samuelson and Smith, 2000a).
Thus, there are reasons to expect that compared to rigid
things, children’s naming of deformables would be more
variable and subject to influences of task structure. There
is some indication of this in the literature. Samuelson and
Smith (2000) found that 3-year-old children generalized
novel names by similarity in shape in a yes/no task. In contrast, Gathercole and colleagues (Gathercole, Cramer, Somerville, & Haar, 1995) found that 4-year-old children were
more likely to attend to substance when naming deformable stimuli in a forced-choice task (see also Samuelson et al.,
2008). However, direct comparison between studies is difficult due to differences in the stimuli used and the specifics of
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the task (i.e. whether a function or property of the exemplar
was demonstrated prior to naming). Further, the use of children of different ages across studies also means that participants differed in vocabulary, which has been suggested to
be a critical determinate to attention to shape in similar tasks
(Gathercole and Min, 1997; Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith,
2004; Samuelson and Smith, 1999).
1.2. Overview of this study
The fact that some factors associated with deformables
may direct children’s attention to similarities in material,
while other factors may direct their attention to similarities in shape provides an opportunity to probe whether and
how the specifics of the task influence children’s noun generalizations. Toward this end, we present an experiment
that contrasts the performance of children the same age
and with the same productive vocabulary across forcedchoice and yes/no noun generalization tasks with the same
stimuli. Data from this experiment suggest important differences in the specifics of children’s performance related
to the particulars of the two tasks. We present a dynamic
field model to formally specify the real-time processes that
turn knowledge of nominal categories into a forced-choice
or yes/no response. The model reveals constraints on the
structure of the accumulated knowledge children bring to
bear in these tasks. We show that the combination of the
hypothesized processes and knowledge accurately captures
both global qualitative differences in performance across
forced-choice and yes/no tasks as well as specific quantitative differences.
Next, we quantitatively fit data from 2- to 4-year-old children from a study using the same stimuli in a yes/no task.
These fits illustrate how changes in children’s accumulated
knowledge of nominal categories translate into developmental changes in behavior in this task. Thus, the model illustrates how an understanding of process provides insights
both into what children bring to the task based on their prior
history and how this accumulated prior history changes
over time. The model also illustrates the dynamic nature of
knowledge and it’s inseparability from process, and thus,
has important implications for our understanding of cognition more generally.
2. Experiment 1
Most of the categories of rigid things that young children
learn to name early provide clear links among solidity, category organization, and syntax—solid, rigid things tend to
be in categories organized by similarity in shape and tend
to be named with count nouns (Samuelson & Smith, 1999).
Moreover, research suggests that children learn to exploit
this regularity in novel noun generalization (Samuelson,
2002; Smith et al., 2002). In contrast, the deformable things
children learn to name early do not present as regular a relationship (Gathercole et al., 1995; Samuelson and Smith, 1999;
Samuelson and Smith, 2000a). Many deformable things have
specific shapes but those shapes can be changed. Adults typ-
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ically judge deformable things, like nonsolid substances,
to be in categories well organized by similarity in material
substance, but deformable things, like rigid objects, are often named with count nouns (Samuelson & Smith, 2000a).
Given the possibility that young children could organize deformable things by either shape or material, the purpose of
this experiment was to directly examine the extent to which
children’s noun generalizations with deformable things are
influenced by the task. We collected novel noun generalizations in forced-choice and yes/no tasks from groups of
children that were the same in age and productive vocabulary. We tested 2.5-year-old children because previous studies suggest developmental changes in the amount of attention to shape in noun generalization between 2 and 3 years
of age (Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith, 2004; Landau et al., 1998;
Samuelson et al., 2008; Smith et al., 1992), and because pilot testing suggested that children this age could effectively
complete both forced-choice and yes/no versions of the task.
In both tasks, we highlighted the rigidity or deformability of
the exemplar object before naming it. This was done to ensure children were aware of the relevant differences in the
stimuli, and because prior studies with these and similar
stimuli had used this procedure (Gathercole and Min, 1997;
Samuelson and Smith, 2000a; Samuelson et al., 2008).
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two monolingual, English-speaking children
(M = 31 m 13 d, range = 28 m 16 d–32 m 24 d; 18 girls, 14
boys) were recruited from local county birth records. All of
the children were from middle-class families. Half of the
children participated in a forced-choice task (8 females, 8
males) and half in a yes/no task (6 females, 10 males). Children in the forced-choice and yes/no conditions did not
differ in age (M = 31 m 11 d and 31 m 16 d, respectively),
t(30) = .36, ns, or total noun vocabulary (M = 284.8 and 293.5,
respectively), t(30) = .88, ns, as measured by the MacArthurBates Communicative Development Inventory: Words and
Sentences (MCDI; Fenson et al., 1994)—a validated parental checklist of the 680 words commonly learned by children
up to 30-months of age. Data from an additional four children who participated in the yes/no condition were not analyzed due to experimental error (1), because the child did not
finish (1), or due to a potential language delay (2). Informed
consent was obtained from children’s parent or guardian
prior to the experimental session. Children received a small
gift for participating.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Nine objects familiar to young children were used on
training trials. The exemplar for these trials was a purple plastic egg. The test objects were an identical egg, a red
wooden block, a plastic flower, a plastic teapot, a small basket, a rubber duck, a multi-colored miniature slinky, and a
small stuffed dinosaur. All of the objects were similar in size.
Four sets of novel objects were used during the test trials (see Figure 1). Each set consisted of an exemplar and
six test objects. For each set, two of the test objects were the
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same shape as the exemplar but were a different color and
were made from a different material, two were made from
the same material as the exemplar but were a different shape
and color, and two were the same color as the exemplar
but different in shape and material. The exemplars for sets
1 and 2 were made from rigid materials. The exemplars for
sets 3 and 4 were made from nonrigid, deformable materials. The exemplar for set 1 was a 14.0 cm × 3.8 cm barbellshaped piece of wood painted green with a bumpy texture.
The exemplar for set 2 was an 8.3 cm in diameter blue clay
ball with four clay pegs. The exemplar for set 3 was a 14.0 cm
tall × 5.7 cm wide piece of yellow sponge cut into a rounded
“V” shape. The exemplar for set 4 was an 11.4 cm × 9.5 cm
pink polygon-shaped plastic bean bag. A white tray divided
into two equal sections was used to present the stimuli in the
forced-choice task.
Each exemplar had two different kinds of properties that
could be demonstrated. One kind of property was designed
to highlight the shape of the rigid exemplars and the material of the deformable exemplars. These properties are referred to as “related” properties because they were based on
the shape of the rigid exemplars and the material of the deformable exemplars. The related property for sets 1, 2, 3, and
4 were rolling, fitting into a puzzle, squishing into a cup, and
folding, respectively (see Figure 1). The other kind of property was not based on the shape, color, or material of the exemplar. Thus, these are referred to as “arbitrary” properties. Because children only saw two arbitrary properties and
because these properties were not based on any features of
the exemplars, the same two arbitrary properties—having a
small design on that glowed in the dark or a sticker on the
back—were used for all four sets. Four novel names—Rel,
Hux, Kiv, and Gaz—were used.
2.1.3. Design and procedure
The design was identical for the forced-choice and yes/
no conditions. Each child saw all four sets of stimuli. Each
child saw a related property demonstrated for one of the
rigid exemplars and an arbitrary property demonstrated for
the other. Likewise, each child saw a related property demonstrated for one of the deformable exemplars and an arbitrary property demonstrated for the other. Which exemplar
had related and which had arbitrary properties was counterbalanced across children in each condition.
Children sat across from the experimenter at a large table. Parents sat next to their child and were asked not to direct their child’s responses in any way. Parents completed
the MBCDI during the experimental session.
In the forced-choice condition, the experiment began with
a series of training trials to familiarize the child with the
task and experimental setting. On the first training trial, the
child was introduced to a stuffed animal and told, “Edward
is a very picky bear. He only likes things like this”. The experimenter then showed the child the egg exemplar. To familiarize the child with the demonstration procedure the experimenter then said, “This is an egg, and you know what?
It opens”, and opened and closed the egg. The experimenter
set the egg by Edward and told the child they were going to
find more eggs for Edward. The experimenter gave the child
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Figure 1. Stimuli used in the experiment.

two test objects to explore briefly—a second egg identical to
the named exemplar, and another object that differed from
the egg in shape, color, and material. The experimenter then
retrieved the two test objects, placed them on the tray, said,
“Remember this is an egg, and it opens (pointing to the exemplar)”. She then asked, “Can you get another egg?” while
sliding the tray towards the child. Children were praised if
they chose the egg and corrected otherwise. The experimenter
then gave the child the test objects for the next trial which proceeded in the same manner. The experimenter reminded the
child that the egg opened on each training trial. The right/left
position of the egg on the tray alternated across trials. To ensure that children understood the task, training trials continued until the child made four consecutive correct responses
or until they had completed eight trials, at which point the

experimenter continued with the test trials. All children answered at least two training trials correctly.
The test trials proceeded in the same manner as the training trials, with the exception that children’s responses were
neither praised nor corrected. For each of the four stimulus
sets, the experimenter introduced the child to a new stuffed
animal and a novel object, for example, “Nathan only likes
things like this. This is a rel, and you know what? It rolls”.
The experimenter demonstrated the assigned property and
placed the exemplar next to the animal. In order to reduce
the total number of trials, and because prior studies indicated that children rarely generalized novel names to color
match test objects (Samuelson et al., 2008; Samuelson &
Smith, 2000a), children did not see the color match stimuli
in the forced-choice condition. Thus, on each trial the child
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was presented with a shape match and a material match.
Within each set, each shape match was presented once with
each material match for a total of four trials per set. Before
each trial, the experimenter reminded the child of the exemplar’s name and demonstrated property (e.g., “Remember, this is a rel and it rolls”). After the child completed the
four trials for one set, they were allowed to choose a sticker
to take home before the experimenter moved on to the next
set. Children’s choices were coded offline from videotape
by coders unaware of the experimental hypotheses. Intercoder reliabilities were obtained for 25% of the sessions using exact percent agreement. Agreement between the two
coders was 94%. All disagreements were resolved by review of the videotapes.
As in the force choice condition, the yes/no condition
began with training trials. The same training stimuli were
used. On the first training trial, the child was introduced to
a stuffed animal and told that the animal only liked eggs and
was shown a plastic egg. The experimenter demonstrated
that the egg opened and then brought out a series of test objects one at a time and, for each, asked, “Is this an egg?” As in
the forced-choice condition, the experimenter reminded the
child that the egg opened before each test trial. During training, the experimenter praised the child for correct responses
and corrected incorrect responses. Each child was presented
with up to eight randomly ordered training trials, which included at least two presentations of the identical egg. To
ensure that children understood the task, we required that
children correctly answer four consecutive training trials in
order to be included in the analysis (c.f., Samuelson & Smith,
2000a). All children met this criterion.
The test trials proceeded in the same manner as the
training trials with the exception that the experimenter did
not praise or correct the child during these trials and different stimulus sets were used. The experimenter introduced
the child to a stuffed animal, told the child the animal only
“wants things like this”, named the exemplar and demonstrated the property for the child before placing the exemplar by the animal. Then the experimenter presented each
test object one at a time. Before presenting each test object, the experimenter reminded the child of the exemplar’s
property. For example, the experimenter would say “Remember, this is a rel and it rolls”, and then present a test
object and ask, “Is this a rel?” After all six test objects for a
set were presented, the experimenter moved on to the next
set. As in previous studies using this task, we required that
children say “no” to at least one test object during the experimental trials in order to be included in the final analyses (c.f., Samuelson & Smith, 2000a). All children met this
criterion. This provided an additional check that children
understood the task. The order of exemplars and test objects was randomly determined and counterbalanced across
children. Children’s yes/no responses were recorded by
the experimenter during the experiment.
2.2. Results
The left panels of Figure 2 show the proportion of shape
choices in the forced-choice task for deformable (top panel)
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and rigid (bottom panel) exemplars. The right panels of the
figure show the proportion of yes responses to each of the
three test objects in the yes/no task for the deformable (top
panel) and rigid (bottom panel) exemplars. Analyses revealed no effects of relatedness (i.e., whether an arbitrary
or related property was demonstrated); thus, the figure collapses across this factor. The data in the figure indicate that
children’s attention to shape when naming deformable exemplars was influenced by the task, while attention to
shape when naming rigid exemplars remained uniformly
high regardless of the task. We first examined the patterns
of noun generalization within each task using ANOVAs.
We then performed a set of analyses comparing data from
the two tasks directly.
2.2.1. Forced-choice task
As can be seen in the left panels of Figure 2, children were
more likely to generalize names for deformable things by
similar material than by similar shape, but systematically
generalized novel names for rigid things by similar shape.
This was confirmed by a rigidity (rigid vs. deformable) × relatedness (related vs. arbitrary) repeated measures ANOVA
in which both factors were within subjects. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of rigidity F(1, 15) = 29.25,
p < .0001, ηp2 = .66, but no other main effects or interactions. t-Tests against chance confirmed that children chose
shape-matching test objects at levels significantly below
chance when exemplars were deformable, t(15) = −2.145,
p < .05, d = .24, but above chance when exemplars were rigid,
t(15) = 5.13, p < .001, d = 1.037.
2.2.2. Yes/no task
As can be seen in the right panels of Figure 2, children
were more likely to generalize novel names for both deformable and rigid exemplars by shape in the yes/no
task. Children’s yes responses were entered into a rigidity (rigid vs. deformable) × relatedness (related vs. arbitrary) × test object (shape, color, material) repeated measures ANOVA. There were significant main effects of
rigidity, F(1, 15) = 6.32, p < .05, ηp2 = .30, and test object,
F(1, 30) = 28.36, p < .0001, ηp2 = .65, and a significant rigidity × test object interaction, F(1, 30) = 7.36, p < .01, ηp2 = .33.
There were no significant main effects or interactions involving relatedness. Thus, the data were collapsed across
relatedness and further analyzed via simple effects tests
split by rigidity.
For the deformable exemplars, there was a significant effect of test object, F(1, 30) = 17.12, p < .0001, ηp2 = .59. Follow-up Fisher’s PLSD tests revealed that the proportion of
yes responses to shape-matching test objects was significantly higher than the proportion of yes responses to material-matching test objects which in turn, was higher than
the proportion for color-matching test objects. For the rigid
exemplars, there was also a significant effect of test object,
F(1, 30) = 27.53, p < .0001, ηp2 = .65. Follow-up Fisher’s PLSD
tests revealed that the proportion of yes responses to the
shape-matching test objects was higher than the proportions
for the material- and color-matching test objects, which did
not differ significantly.
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Figure 2. Data from the experiment. The left panels show the proportion of shape choices for deformable and rigid exemplars following demonstrations of related and arbitrary properties in the forced-choice task. The right panels show the corresponding proportions of yes responses to the
shape-, color-, and material-matching test objects in the yes/no task. There were no effects of relatedness so the figure collapses across this factor.

2.2.3. Comparison across tasks
Analyses of responses in each task suggest that 2.5-yearold children generalized novel names for rigid things by
shape in both the forced-choice and yes/no tasks, but
only systematically generalized novel names for deformable things by material in the forced-choice task. To examine the difference in responding across tasks more directly,
we compared the yes/no and forced-choice data after converting the yes/no data to proportion of shape choices via
the Luce choice rule (Luce, 1963). Specifically, for individual
children the proportion of shape choices for a given stimulus
set was taken to be equal to the proportion of yes responses
to shape-matching test objects divided by the sum of the
proportion of yes responses to shape- and material-matching test objects.1 We collapsed over relatedness in this analysis because the ANOVAs showed no significant effects of
this factor. Thus, the proportion of shape choices for the deformable and rigid sets was taken to be equal to the average
proportion of yes responses to shape-matching test objects
1. One child in the yes/no task said “no” to all the deformable test objects. This would result in a proportion shape score of 0 by the Luce
choice rule, even though the child did not say “yes” to any of the
material-matching test objects. Thus, to be conservative, we opted to
not include data from this child in this analysis.

divided by the sum of the average proportions of yes responses to shape- and material-matching test objects. These
data are shown in Figure 3, along with the corresponding
data from the forced-choice task.

Figure 3. Comparison of performance in the forced-choice and yes/
no tasks of the experiment. Yes/no data were converted to proportion
shape choices via the Luce choice rule.
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Table 1. Numbers of individual children in the forced-choice and
yes/no conditions of Experiment 1 whose proportion of shape choices
was below chance (<.50), at chance levels (<.50) or above chance (.<.50)
for the deformable and rigid stimulus sets. Results of chi-square tests
of homogeneity of proportions comparing the patterns of responding
across the two tasks for each stimulus set are also provided.
		

Condition

		
Deformable
Proportion shape

Rigid
Proportion shape

Forced-choice

Yes/no

< .50
= .50
> .50

6
9
1
χ2(2) = 11.23, p < .01

2
4
9

< .50
= .50
> .50

2
1
13
χ2(2) = 3.80, ns

0
4
12

The total number of children reported for the yes/no task with deformable stimuli is not equal to 16 because one child said no to all the
deformable test objects.

As is clear in the figure, the proportion of shape choices
made when a rigid exemplar was named did not differ
across task. Importantly, however, the proportion of shape
choices made when a deformable exemplar was named differed markedly across tasks. We analyzed this data at the
level of individual children. Table 1 provides the numbers
of individual children in each condition whose proportion of
shape choices was below chance (<.50), at chance (=.50) or
above chance (>.50) for both the deformable and rigid stimulus sets. As is clear in the table, with deformable stimuli
there were more children whose proportion of shape choices
was at or below chance in the forced-choice condition than
the yes/no condition. In contrast, with the rigid stimuli
the numbers of children whose proportion shape choices
was above chance were almost identical across tasks. Chisquare tests of homogeneity of proportions revealed a significant difference across conditions with deformable stimuli, χ2(2) = 11.23, p < .01, w = .60, but no significant difference
with rigid stimuli, χ2(2) = 3.80, ns.
2.3. Discussion
These results indicate that children equated for age and
productive vocabulary generalize names for deformable
stimuli differently when presented with a forced-choice compared to a yes/no task. Specifically, data from the forcedchoice task suggest that 2.5-year-old children think that rigid
things are named by similarity in shape whereas deformable
things are named by similarity in material substance. In contrast, data from the yes/no task suggest children this age do
not distinguish between rigid and deformable things in naming, and generalize names for both kinds by shape similarity.
In this way, then, data from the two tasks lead to different
conclusions about what children know about how deformable things are named. Given that the same stimuli were
used in the two tasks and that groups were equated for age
and vocabulary level, these data suggest that differences in
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the processes that bring children’s accumulated vocabulary
knowledge to bear in each task are critical to determining the
specifics of their performance.
There are two critical differences between the forcedchoice task and the yes/no task that seem likely to influence
children’s behavior. First, in the forced-choice task, children
see the two test objects at the same time in close proximity
(i.e., on the same tray), whereas in the yes/no version of the
task, children see each test object one at a time. Thus, children can make direct comparisons between the test objects in
the forced-choice task, but must make these comparisons in
memory (if at all) in the yes/no version of the task. Second,
the nature of the forced-choice task is to force the child to
pick one object to the exclusion of the other, whereas in the
yes/no version of the task, the child is free to say yes (or no)
to all of the test items individually.
These differences have important implications for how
children’s prior history of perceiving and acting is brought
to bear in a moment in time, that is, for how their accumulated knowledge of nominal categories is brought to bear
in different novel noun generalization tasks. For example,
a relatively small bias to favor similarity in material may be
magni.ed when children are forced to pick between a test object that matches an exemplar in shape and one that matches
it in material. Likewise, a relatively weak appreciation of the
importance of shape for deformable things may be more robust in a yes/no task because judgments of the similarity of
shape and material test objects are made independently. To
probe these issues in greater detail, we implemented these
task differences in a dynamic field model and simulated performance in the forced-choice and yes/no versions of the
novel noun generalization task.
3. Quantitative modeling of performance across tasks
The general goal of these simulations was to examine
the possibility that different patterns of behavior can arise
in the forced-choice and yes/no tasks even when the same
stimuli are used and the same knowledge is accessed. If this
is the case, it suggests that some of the differences observed
in the previous experiment may arise from the specifics of
the real-time processes that combine perceptual inputs with
long-term memory of how stimuli are categorized to create
responses in novel noun generalization tasks. The specific
goal of our modeling efforts was to quantitatively fit the
data from the experiment, that is, to produce the particular amounts of attention to shape and material we found in
2.5-year-olds in a model that captures the processing differences underlying the forced-choice and yes/no tasks. Note
that we did not simulate the demonstrations of related and
arbitrary properties because this aspect of the task had little
influence on children’s performance. Likewise, we did not
simulate performance with the color-matching stimuli because these stimuli were not included in the forced-choice
task.
In what follows, we first present a general overview of
our dynamic field model, including qualitative results from
single representative simulations of performance in each
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task. We then discuss the selection of the particular parameters we used. Finally, we present quantitative results from
our simulations of the data from the experiment, followed by
a discussion of the implications of this modeling work. The
details of the model, including the model equations, can be
found in the Appendix.
3.1. The model
The starting point for the model is work by Spencer and
colleagues modeling the dynamics of responses in forcedchoice and discrimination (same/different) tasks (Johnson,
Spencer, & Schöner, 2008; Simmering, Spencer, & Schöner,
2006; Spencer, Simmering, & Schutte, 2006). Our model, pictured in Figure 4A, is an extension of the Dynamic Field Theory (DFT), a general theory of spatial cognition and visual
working memory (see Johnson et al., 2008; Spencer, Simmering, Schutte, & Schöner, 2007). The current work builds
on prior theoretical, computational, and empirical work using DFT to capture real-time and developmental change in
tasks ranging from spatial memory to change detection to
habituation in infancy. Note that by ‘‘real-time” we are referring to the time scale of processes that generate individual responses within a trial. Previous work has mapped the
real-time generation of peaks in similar dynamic neural .eld
models to the generation of neural representations in visual cortex and motor cortex (Bastian, Riehle, Erlhagen, &
Schöner, 1998; Bastian, Schöner, & Riehle, 2003; Jancke et al.,
1999). However, this is the .rst application of DFT concepts
to task-specific behavior in a wordlearning context (for related work, see Faubel & Schöner, 2008).
The model consists of an input field (top field in panel A)
and decision field (bottom field Panel A). The x-axis of each
field shows a set of neurons arranged by “similarity.” Neurons that are tuned to respond to stimuli that are similar overall (i.e., with receptive fields tuned to similar values along particular feature dimensions) would be close neighbors along
this dimension, while neurons that are tuned to respond to
stimuli that are dissimilar overall would be far from one another along this dimension. The activation of each neuron is
plotted along the y-axis. Time is shown along the z-axis as the
sequence of events in a single trial unfolds. Note that many
models of similarity and object categorization compute similarity as the distance between the high-dimensional representations generated by, say, the presentation of two objects (e.g.,
Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1987; Samuelson, 2002). Our use
of similarity capitalizes on this idea, that is, we assume a system that can represent similarity in this way and pass metric
input regarding the distance between two items to the decision field probed here (for an additional discussion of the concept of “similarity” in dynamic field models, see the Section 5
and Faubel & Schöner, 2008). Importantly, we assume that the
metric similarity input to the model reflects similarity in the
context of a naming task (see discussion of parameters below).
Note also that the strength of inputs captures the salience of
each item. Salience can be affected by multiple factors such as
long-term learning about which features of objects are important for word learning, or factors such as whether an item is
within graspable space.
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The stimuli were presented to the model via the input
field. Inputs took the form of Gaussians representing the exemplar (leftmost peak) and two test objects, positioned according to their relative similarities (see Section 3.2). The
number of test objects presented to the decision field differed
according to the task (see below). The exemplar was present throughout the trial in both tasks, but its activation was
lower because it is farther from the child.
The time-dependent processes (i.e., the dynamics) that
determine the model’s response occur in the decision field.
Neurons in this field interact according to a local excitation/
lateral inhibition function, a form of interaction common
in neural models of cortical function (e.g., Durstewitz, Seamans, & Sejnowski, 2000). This means that neurons close to
one another along the similarity dimension excite one another while neurons far apart inhibit each other. The local
excitation/lateral inhibition function allows the network to
form stable peaks of activation that represent behavioral decisions to, for instance, select a particular input in a forcedchoice task. It is also possible, however, that the model will
fail to form an activation peak. Whether this occurs depends
on the similarity of inputs, the strength of neural interactions
(i.e., the details of the interaction function), and the resting
level of the neurons in the field. The critical differences between the forced-choice and yes/no versions of the novel
noun generalization task emerge from differences in the
strength and time structure of the inputs and from the interactive dynamics of the decision field. These differences are
described below.
3.1.1. Dynamics of the forced-choice task
In the forced-choice version of the novel noun generalization task, the child is presented with two test objects at the
same time and encouraged to pick one on each trial. Thus,
children have the opportunity to compare the test objects directly and have to make a relatively constrained response—
select one object over the other. As can be seen in the top
field of Figure 4A, on each trial the model is also presented
with two test objects at the same time and encouraged to
pick one—that is, to form a peak of activation centered at
one input or the other. To capture the highly selective nature of this task, we made the inputs strong and the decision field competitive (i.e., neurons interact strongly). This
allows for a detailed “comparison” between stimuli. Figure
5 shows the interaction kernels for each task (see Table 2 for
specific parameter values). As can bee seen in the figure, the
parameters that structured the interaction dynamics in the
forced-choice task were such that the decision field started
relatively far from threshold (see hi in Table 2) and had
strong levels of inhibition (see wiFC in Figure 5) with strong
excitatory interaction (weFC in Figure 5) and strong inputs (κ).
Consequently, the decision field reflected the inputs strongly
and was highly competitive. When the tray was moved forward and the resting level boosted (see hb in Table 2), competition increased and the field was forced to make a selection.
Importantly, this set of parameters put the field in a regime
in which the peak that formed was centered at the location
of one of the two test objects, rather than at an indeterminate
location or at the location of the exemplar.

a dynamic field model of children’s novel noun generalization

331

Figure 4. Dynamic field model used to simulate differences in performance in forced-choice and yes/no tasks. Model consists of an input field
(top field in Panel A) and decision field (bottom field Panel A). The x-axis of each field represents a set of neurons arranged by “similarity”. Activation of each neuron is plotted along the y-axis. Time is shown along the z-axis as the sequence of events in a single trial unfolds. Panel A depicts
a forced-choice trial. The top two fields in Panel B depict a yes/no trial with similar inputs, the bottom two fields, a yes/no trial with dissimilar inputs. See text for further details.
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Figure 5. Interaction functions for the decision field when the model performed the forced-choice (solid line) and yes/no (dashed line) tasks. The
solid line at 0 marks the difference between excitatory interactions and inhibitory interactions. Bars indicate magnitude of parameter values given
in Table 2. See text for details.

Table 2. Parameters used in model simulations. Parameters in the upper half of the table structured the interactive dynamics in the response field
for the forced-choice and yes/no tasks. Parameters in the lower half of the table specified the Gaussian inputs for the deformable and rigid test
sets. The three values of each parameter in this section correspond to the exemplar, shape-matching test object, and material-matching test object,
respectively. See text for discussion.
Parameters for interactive dynamics
		
Interaction inhibition
Interaction strength
Initial H level
Response H level
Input gain

Forced–choice
(wi)
(we)
(hi)
(hb)
(κ)

Yes/no

7.0
20
−15.0
−2.0
6.7

Description
1.0
8.68
−5.0
−2.365
1.0

How much neurons inhibit each other
Amount of interaction between neurons
Resting level of field
Field resting when response requested
Strength of input to decision field

Input parameters
Deformable (exemplar, shape, material)				
Input width
(σD)
60, 20, 22		
Input centers
(xCD)
21, 41, 56		
Input strength
(AD)
1.0, 1.3163, 1.3623		
Rigid (exemplar, shape, material)				
Input width
(σR)
(60, 20, 26) (.80)		
Input centers
(xCR)
21, 41, 56		
Input strength
(AR)
1.0, 1.3690, 1.3670

The course of events as a single forced-choice trial unfolds can
be seen in the bottom field of Figure 4A. At the start of the trial
(back of figure), all three inputs (pictured in the input field at

the top) are fed into the decision field (lower field in panel A).
The decision field is given a boost of activation at the point in
the trial corresponding to when the tray with the test objects is
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slid towards the child and a request for a response is made. In
the model, this change increases both competition among the
neurons and the overall activation in the field, thereby forcing the creation of a single, stable peak centered at one of the
test objects. As can be seen in the figure, on this trial the model
formed a peak at the location of the material-matching test object; thus it “picked” this test object.
3.1.2. Dynamics of the yes/no task
In the yes/no version of the novel noun generalization
task, the child is presented with each test object individually and must make a yes or no response for each. Consequently, the judgments children make concerning each test
object are relatively independent in this task—children can
say “yes” or “no” to each test object. Overall then, the decisions children make in the yes/no task are less constrained
and are more sensitive to the similarity of an individual test
object and the exemplar. As can be seen in the top field of
Figure 4B, the model was also presented with one test object
at a time and made an independent judgment of each. The
formation of a stable peak in the decision field represented a
“yes” response and the failure to form a stable peak, a “no”
response. To capture the greater reliance on overall similarity in the yes/no task, we made neurons in the decision
field more excitable and less competitive (see weYN in Figure
5), thereby allowing more blending across stimuli with good
sensitivity to overlap in the input. In the yes/no task, the decision field started closer to threshold (hi) with weaker inhibition (see wiYN in Figure 5) and weaker inputs (κ). Consequently, inputs (in this case, only one test object and the
exemplar) could blend, and the slight boost in the resting
level (hb) at the time a response was requested allowed for
the formation of a stable peak of activation provided there
was enough overlapping activation.
The top two fields of Figure 4B show a simulation of a
trial where there is relatively high similarity between the
exemplar and the test object, while the bottom fields show
a simulation with relatively low similarity. As can be seen
in Figure 4B, when the inputs are close together, the locally excitatory interactions among neurons in the decision
field cause the activation associated with these stimuli to
blend and increase over time, ultimately combining to form
a single activation profile. If this activation reaches a critical
threshold—an activation level above 0—the model forms a
self-sustaining peak and responds “yes” (second field from
top in Figure 4B). As can also be seen in the figure, however,
when the inputs are farther apart, activation patterns do not
blend in the decision field. Thus, no above-threshold peak is
formed and the model responds “no” (bottom field in Figure 4B).
3.1.3. Summary of qualitative results
Considered together, the simulations in Figure 4 highlight
that the details of the processes that bring knowledge to bear
in a task have a critical influence on the specifics of the resulting performance. In particular, note that the exact same inputs were used in the simulations presented in panels A and B of
Figure 4. In the forced-choice task, the model picked the material-matching test object which was slightly stronger. How-
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ever, when this same test object was presented in the yes/
no task, the fact that this test object was relatively far from
the exemplar meant that the model failed to generate a selfsustaining peak and responded “no”. In contrast, when the
input representing the shape-matching test object was presented in the yes/no task, the shared similarity caused a selfsustaining peak to form and the model responded “yes”.
Thus, given the exact same inputs in the two tasks, the model
generalized the names differently, demonstrating a material
bias in the forced-choice task, but a shape bias in the yes/no
task. The central question, then, is whether these qualitative
insights can be extended to provide a quantitative account of
the findings from the experiment.
3.2. Method
3.2.1. Model parameters
Table 2 lists the model parameters organized as “interaction” parameters that structured the interactive dynamics in
the decision field for the forced-choice and yes/no tasks, and
“input” parameters that specified the Gaussian inputs for the
deformable and rigid stimulus sets. We discuss constraints
on parameter selection below.
Parameters for interactive dynamics: Selection of the values
for the interaction parameters was constrained by the theoretical proposals reviewed above regarding the nature of the
decision dynamics in the forced-choice and yes/no tasks.
That is, the parameters that specified the interactive dynamics for each task were selected to implement the hypothesis
that the forced-choice task requires children to be highly selective while performance in the yes/no task depends more
on the overall similarity between an individual test object
and the exemplar. If our selected parameters then capture
differences in children’s performance between tasks, this
will support our theoretical proposal about the critical processes that underlie performance in the two tasks.
Note that in the forced-choice task, the model was required to choose one of the two test objects by building a
peak of activation in the decision field centered on the location of one of the two input peaks. In contrast, the particular response made in the yes/no task depends on whether
or not a stable peak of activation forms, not on the exact location of that peak. Thus, we did not require that the parameters for the yes/no task place the field in a regime that constrained peak formation to the location of an input. We did
verify, however, that peaks did not form outside the range of
the inputs to ensure that they were the result of the interaction of the inputs, not spurious peaks created by noise.
As can be seen in Table 2, five parameters that determined the competitive nature of the interactions were varied across tasks. Conceptually, these parameters specify how
children’s attention is modulated by the specifics of the task
(see Section 2.3 for further details).
Input parameters: Selection of the input parameter values was constrained by the goal of presenting the same
rigid and deformable inputs in the two tasks and by the
necessity of finding reasonable parameters given what is
known about children’s attention to shape and material in
novel noun generalization tasks. In addition, we wanted to
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be able to manipulate the inputs to examine possible constrains on the interface between children’s knowledge and
task performance (see Section 2.3). The inputs that represented the exemplar, shape-matching, and material-matching test objects for the deformable and rigid sets were represented by two sets of three Gaussians. Each Gaussian was
specified by three parameters: (1) input center (x), (2) input
width (σ), and (3) input strength (A). The final parameter
values are given in Table 2. In the table, the values given
for each parameter are for the exemplar, shape-matching
test object, and material-matching test object, respectively.
Differences in relative position, strength, and width of the
inputs within and across input sets can be taken to capture
overall similarity, strength, and precision of the representational states, respectively, that were created when children
viewed the stimuli in the context of a novel noun generalization task.
As can be seen in the table, the input width values for test
objects for both the deformable (σD) and rigid (σR) sets were
not as broad as the exemplar in either set. This is because the
test objects were always presented closer to the children than
the exemplar and were the focus of children’s attention. The
fact that the shape-matching test object was a bit narrower
than the material-matching test object in each set fits with
data suggesting children make distinctions in noun generalization based on shape similarity before they make similar distinctions based on material similarity (Gathercole and
Whitfield, 2001; Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson and Smith,
1999). Note that for the rigid stimuli, the input width values were scaled by .80. This fits with the fact that rigid things
generally have more precise featural characteristics than deformable things.
The same input center values were used for the both the
deformable (xCD) and rigid (xCR) sets. In both sets, the shapematching test object was more similar to the exemplar (i.e.,
their centers were closer) than the material-matching test
object. For the deformable set, the greater similarity of the
shape-matching test object to the exemplar fits with the fact
that deformable things have characteristic shapes that they
return to following perturbations. Similarly, for the rigid
set, the greater similarity of the shape-matching test object
fits the fact that rigid things maintain their shape over transformations. The greater similarity of shape-matching test objects to the exemplar in both sets also fits with data suggesting that children have learned an association between the
importance of shape similarity and naming tasks such as the
ones we are modeling (Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson, 2002;
Smith and Samuelson, 2006; Smith et al., 2002).
The input strengths were slightly different for the two
kinds of stimuli. Specifically, for the deformable sets, the material-matching test object had a slightly higher strength than
the shape-matching one. This reflects the importance of material for what can be done with deformable things, especially in a task in which a demonstration is used to highlight
the material composition of some of the stimuli. The two
test objects were more similar in strength for the rigid set,
though the shape-matching test object was slightly stronger
to reflect the importance of shape for what can be done with
rigid things. It is also important to emphasize that the par-

samuelson, schutte,

&

horst in cognition

110 (2009)

ticular strength values in Table 2 were multiplied by the input gain (κ) for each task. Thus, the small differences in the
strength of the material- and shape-matching test objects
within a set were amplified in the forced-choice task relative
to the yes/no task due to the greater input gain.
Figure 6 depicts the inputs for the deformable and rigid
sets that result from the final parameters. This figure highlights the similarity of the inputs across sets. Nevertheless,
we will see that these small differences had a substantial impact on the model’s performance in the context of the interactive dynamics of the decision field.
3.2.2. Simulation details
Simulations were conducted in MATLAB (Mathworks
Inc.) on a PowerMac G5 with dual 2.7 GHz processors (the
MATLAB code is available from the first author on request).
The dynamic field equation was integrated using the Euler
method. Each run of the model in each task simulated a single trial. A network with 101 neurons was used for all simulations. Trials began with the field at the level specified by
hi. The inputs were then presented for 610 time steps. Following this, the resting level was boosted to the level specified by hb. The response was determined after an additional
500 time steps. The response in the forced-choice task was
found by taking the location of the maximum activation in
the decision field at the end of the simulation and determining which of the two inputs it was closest to. Individual simulations verified that the peaks that formed were at the exact
location of one of the test objects. For the yes/no task, the response was taken as a “yes” if the field formed a stable peak
and a “no” otherwise (responses were checked to ensure that
peaks always formed within the range of the inputs). We
conducted 200 repetitions of individual trials from each task
with each stimulus set (deformable and rigid), and verified
that the model converged on similar values across 10 sets of
800 simulations (200 repetitions × 2 tasks × 2 stimulus sets).
3.3. Results and discussion
We calculated the mean number of times the model selected the material- or shape-matching test object in the
forced-choice task as well as the mean number of “yes” and
“no” responses in the yes/no task for the deformable and
rigid stimulus sets. The data from the model simulations
along with the corresponding data from the experiment are
presented in Figure 7. As is clear in the figure, the model fit
the experimental data extremely well. To quantify the fit, we
calculated the root mean squared error (RMS) across the two
stimulus sets and two tasks. This value was .02 for the pictured simulation. We also examined the average RMS for the
10 sets of 800 simulations we conducted. The average was .04
with a standard deviation of .014 and a range of .02–.06. Thus,
the model’s performance shown in Figure 7 was quite robust.
Like the 2.5-year-old children in the experiment, the
model generalized novel names for deformable things by
material in the forced-choice task but by shape in the yes/no
task, and generalized novel names for rigid things by shape
in both tasks. The excellent fit of the model to the data even
though we used the same stimulus sets across tasks thus
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Figure 6. Model inputs for the deformable and rigid sets that result from the final input parameters. Relative overall similarity is represented
along the x-axis, activation along the y-axis. Solid lines represent deformable inputs, dashed lines represent rigid inputs. Each set of inputs includes an exemplar (leftmost peaks), a shape-matching test object (center peaks), and a material-matching test object (rightmost peaks).

confirms the importance of the task dynamics in shaping
children’s behavior when generalizing novel nouns. These
simulation results support the idea that the way children are
asked to generalize novel names can create different patterns
of performance even when the same accumulated vocabulary knowledge is accessed.
The robust fit of the dynamic field model to the data may
lead some to question whether the model is actually too general and whether it could “model anything”. The answer is
no. The dynamic field equations capture strong theoretical
assumptions, for example, that input is localized, that the interaction functions are homogeneous and symmetrical, and
that inputs can be superimposed. Thus, simulation of any arbitrary input–output mapping is precluded by the internal
structure of the DFT. Put differently, the DFT implements a
form of nonlinear decision making where only the right convergence of inputs and interaction dynamics will put the
field into a state that creates a stable peak. Thus, there are
real constraints on processing in this model ensuring that it
cannot capture just any input–output mapping.
Another critical question, however, is whether the details
of the quantitative simulations are meaningful in the context
of the extant literature. To evaluate this issue, we conducted
a set of follow-up analyses of the model’s performance. We
first asked whether the ordering of the inputs on the similarity dimension was critical to the results. Recall that the
shape-matching test object was closer to the exemplar for
both the rigid and deformable input sets. This configuration
implies that the shape-matching test object is more similar to

the material-matching one in the representational state created when children view these stimuli in these tasks. To test
the necessity of this similarity relationship for the obtained
results, we set up inputs in which the material-matching
test object was more similar to the exemplar than the shapematching test object in the deformable stimulus set. Even
though this set of inputs was otherwise quite similar to the
final set, we were not able to capture the full pattern of results seen in Figure 7 with inputs structured this way.
More specifically, we were only able to adequately capture data from one task at a time with the deformable inputs
structured in this way. In order to capture children’s yeses
to the deformable shape-matching test object in the yes/
no task, the shape-matching test object must overlap somewhat with the exemplar. However, this configuration causes
the material-matching test object to be so close to the exemplar that the model chooses it more than the children did
in the forced-choice task. This is the critical trade-off seen
in children’s performance in these tasks—they are sensitive
enough to importance of shape for deformable things that
they do generalize novel names for deformable things by
shape in the yes/no task. However, when forced to choose
between shape- and material-matching test objects, they
generalize novel names by material similarity more often.
This trade-off is realized in the parameters for the deformable set—the shape-matching test object is necessarily closer
to the exemplar, resulting in “yes” responses in the yes/no
task, but the material-matching test object is stronger, resulting in its greater selection in the forced-choice task.
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Figure 7. Mean proportion of times the model (white bars) selected the shape-matching test object in the forced-choice task as well as the mean
proportion of yes responses to the shape and material-matching test objects in the yes/no task for the deformable and rigid stimulus sets. The corresponding data from children in the experiment are also presented (black bars).

There is another element of children’s responses, however, that the model is also able to capture—the fact that children’s responding is variable. In particular, children do not
always pick the material-matching test object with the deformable stimuli in the forced-choice task, and do not always say “yes” to the shape-matching test object in the yes/
no task. Our use of noisy inputs (see Appendix) is critical to
this result. This noise model implies that the representational
states created when children view these stimuli in these
tasks are somewhat variable, although, importantly, this
noise is coherent across individual inputs. This means that in
the highly-selective forced-choice task, for instance, the (typically) weaker test object may be chosen if noise boosts it’s
activation above the level of the (typically) stronger input. At
the same time, noisy inputs mean that sometimes test objects
that are relatively close to the exemplar are weakened such
that they cannot support the formation of a stable peak and
a “yes” response. Thus, the fit seen in Figure 7 only emerges
when the right set of inputs are given to a model with just

the right interactive dynamics. This fact serves to further validate the relative positioning of the test objects and exemplar
shown in Figure 6, and highlights the importance of the interaction between the specific inputs and the task dynamics
in creating behavior.
One final issue with respect to the modeling work presented thus far is the relation between the different interaction functions used to model the two tasks and the participants in our experimental task. In particular, do differences
in the interactive dynamics used to capture performance in
the two tasks correspond best to different sets of processes
in two different children, or can they be seen as task-related
differences that emerge on-line in an individual child engaged in a specific task? A close examination of the five interaction parameters that changed across the two tasks suggests the latter. In particular, these parameters may be best
viewed as arising from a real-time attentional modulation of
the neural circuits responsible for decision making in these
two tasks. For example, the large value of the input gain pa-
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rameter, κ, in the forced-choice task can be thought of as an
attentional boost related to the amount of stimulation provided by having multiple inputs simultaneously present.
Prior work has demonstrated such changes can occur via
attentional systems in real-time in individual participants
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995).
The task differences in the initial resting level, hi, and the
resting level boost during the response, hb, can be viewed in
a similar way. The parameter, h, is a constant added equally
to all locations in the field. Thus, rather than specifying where
a peak should form, this parameter modulates the possibility that a peak will form by moving the decision field closer
to the peak-formation threshold. Conceptually, the shift in
h during the trial reflects the boost in children’s attention to
the test objects as the tray is slid forward in the forced-choice
task or the children are asked to give a response in the yes/
no task. Note that from this perspective, the smaller boost in
the yes/no task corresponds to the fact that the stimuli are
never moved within reach of the child.
The between-task differences in the final two parameters,
interaction inhibition, wi, and interaction strength, we, are
captured in Figure 5. As can be seen in the figure, the interaction functions for the two tasks are actually very similar, but
the function for the forced-choice task has been lowered and
stretched. The lowering is due to the higher inhibition value
used in the forced-choice task. The stretching of the forcedchoice function is due to the greater interaction strength
used in this task, which creates a greater degree of interactivity overall. Importantly, both of these changes can be
produced in a more neurally-realistic dynamic field model
with separate excitatory and inhibitory layers by changing
the resting levels (h) of both layers (Schutte and Spencer, in
press; Spencer et al., 2007). Because these changes can be created through the modulation of global resting levels, they
can also be thought of as arising via an attentional modulation of the neural populations involved in decision making
in these tasks.
4. Quantitative modeling of developmental changes
Our dynamic field model captures important differences in the processes that underlie performance in forcedchoice and yes/no novel noun generalization tasks. The
excellent fit of the model to the data from 2.5-year-old children in these tasks confirms that the interaction of the input
and task dynamics can result in different patterns of noun
generalization when the same knowledge representations
are processed in two different tasks. Thus, the experimental and simulation results thus far support the perspective
that knowledge cannot be separated from the processes that
bring it to bear in a task, and helps explain why what children appear to know can look different from task to task.
In this section, we extend the modeling work further by exploring another important finding in the literature on children’s novel noun generalization—developmental changes
in noun generalization from 2 to 4 years of age. We focus on
one recent set of experiments that demonstrate changes in
noun generalization in a yes/no task.
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Samuelson et al. (2008) examined novel noun generalization in 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children using the same
rigid and deformable stimuli used in Experiment 1. The
data are shown in Figure 8 (black bars) along with the data
from 2.5-year-old children in the current paper. As is clear
in the figure, these data suggest differences in the proportion of “yes” responses across rigid and deformable stimulus sets, shape- and material-matching test objects, and age.
Our modeling work thus far has captured differences in the
amount of shape responding for rigid and deformable sets
in the yes/no task, as well as differences in the proportion
of yes responses to shape- and material-matching test objects. Our question, then, was whether the DF model could
capture developmental differences in responding in the yes/
no task as well.
Three developmental effects stand out in Figure 8. First,
the proportion of yes responses to test objects that match
rigid exemplars in shape increases from 2 to 3 years of age
and remains high (see A in Figure 8). Second, the proportion
of yes responses to test objects that match both rigid and deformable exemplars in material drops over this period of
development (see Bs in Figure 8). Finally, 3-year-old children demonstrate a higher rate of yes responses to test objects that match deformable exemplars in shape (C in Figure
8; see also Samuelson & Smith, 2000a), compared to 2- and
4-year-old children (see Samuelson et al. (2008) for statistical analysis and replication of the high shape responding in
3-year-old children).
To capture these developmental differences in the model,
we instantiated two hypotheses about changes over development in how children actively represent stimuli in a naming context captured by the input array: (1) that the association between shape and naming increases over development
and (2) that stimulus representations become less noisy (i.e.,
more stable) over development. The first hypothesis fits with
a number of studies in the literature on early word learning that suggest children’s attention to shape when naming
novel objects becomes stronger over development (Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith, 2004; Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson
and Smith, 1999; Smith et al., 1992). The second hypothesis fits with recent arguments concerning the nature of developmental change and work using similar DF models
(Schöner & Dineva, 2007). For example, Schutte and Spencer
(in press) captured the pattern of developmental change in
young children’s spatial memory via changes in the specifics of the local excitation/lateral inhibition function in a DF
model of spatial cognition. These changes in neural interaction resulted in more stable representations of items in working memory, that is, reduced noise in how children actively
represented stimuli as hypothesized here. The critical question is whether the complex pattern of results would emerge
when these two developmental changes to children’s representations interact with the real-time decision processes captured in the model.
4.1. Methods
The model was identical to that used previously except
where noted below. That is, we used the same interactive
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Figure 8. Mean proportion of yes responses by 2-, 2.5-, 3-, and 4-year-old children (black bars), and the DF model (white bars) to shape- and material-matching test objects in the yes/no task for deformable and rigid stimulus sets. Thirty-two month-old data are from the current paper. Two-,
3- and 4-year-old data are from Samuelson et al. (2008).

dynamics parameters for the yes/no task and the same input parameters for the rigid and deformable stimuli. To
simulate development (2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children), we
scaled the noise strength, q, and varied the strength of the
shape inputs relative to the values used previously for our
simulations of the data from 2.5-year-old children. Specifically, noise strength (q) decreased systematically over
development, while the strength of the shape inputs increased over development. The differences in noise and
shape strength relative to the prior simulations are depicted in Figure 9.
Simulations were conducted in MATLAB (Mathworks
Inc.) on a PowerMac G5 with dual 1.8 GHz processors. Otherwise, the simulations were identical in detail to the previous set. Each run of the model simulated a single trial with a
given stimulus set. We conducted 200 repetitions with each
stimulus set (deformable and rigid) at each developmental level, and verified that the model converged on similar
values across 10 sets of 400 simulations (200 repetitions × 2
stimulus sets) at each developmental level.

4.2. Results and discussion
We calculated the mean number of times the model made
“yes” and “no” responses for the deformable and rigid stimulus sets at each developmental level. Data from the model
simulations are presented in Figure 8 (white bars). As is clear
in the figure, the model fit the data very well. To quantify the
fit, we calculated the root mean squared error across the two
stimulus sets and three developmental levels. This value was
.04 for the pictured simulation. We also examined the average RMS for the 10 sets of 400 simulations we conducted at
each age level. The average was .05 with a standard deviation of .014 and a range of .03–.08. Thus, the model’s performance shown in Figure 8 was quite robust.
These simulations, then, suggest that changes in young
children’s attention to shape and material from 2 to 4 years
of age are related to changes in the strength of the link between naming tasks and attention to shape, and the precision of the representational states created when children
view the stimuli in these tasks. Both of these developmen-
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Figure 9. Change in noise strength (q) and shape strength parameters across simulated developmental levels relative to simulations of 2.5-year-old
children.

tal hypotheses have support in the literature. Nevertheless,
an important question is whether both of these changes are
necessary to create the observed pattern in the data. To examine this issue, we attempted to capture the pattern of results seen in Figure 8 in two additional sets of simulations
that included changes to either noise strength or shape input strength separately. In the simulations that manipulated noise strength only, the best parameter values were .05,
.045, and .038 for the 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old simulations, respectively. These values resulted in a average RMS of .05 for
the best single run at each developmental level, but an overall average RMS of .078 (SD = .039, range .02–.14) across 10
sets of 400 simulations at each developmental level. A two
sample t-test revealed that the RMS values for the noiseonly simulations were significantly poorer than those for the
main simulations reported above, t(58) = −3.65, p < .001. This
poor performance is due to the fact that reducing noise in
the model serves to reduce the number of “yes” responses
overall, which is not the developmental pattern children
show between 2 and 4 years of age. Four-year-old children
do show an overall reduction in yes responses compared
to 3-year-old children. However, between 2 and 3 years of
age, the number of yes responses increases for shape-matching test objects while decreasing for material-matching test
objects (compare A and B in Figure 8). Thus, while changing noise strength alone results in relatively low RMS values,
there is no consistent set of changes to this parameter alone
that can simultaneously capture children’s responding to the
shape- and material-matching test objects.
A similar pattern emerged in the simulations that manipulated shape input strength only. The best parameter values for this set of simulations were 1.00000001, 1.00036, and
.9995 for the 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old simulations, respectively.
Because the difference in 2.5- and 3-year-old children’s re-

sponding was captured in the main simulations with a
change in the noise strength parameter alone, we used the
main simulations for 2.5-year-olds in this follow-up. These
values resulted in a average RMS of .08 for the best single
run at each developmental level, and an overall average
RMS of .088 (SD = .026, range .04–.13) across 10 sets of 400
simulations at each developmental level. A two sample t-test
revealed that the RMS values for the shape-multiplier-only
simulations were significantly poorer than those for the main
simulations reported above, t(58) = −6.87, p < .001. This poor
performance is due to the fact that increasing the strength
of the shape input does not influence responding to the material-matching stimuli which contrasts with results shown
in Figure 8. Thus, while changing shape strength alone results in relatively low RMS values, it does not capture the
full pattern of results. In particular, there are no consistent
set of changes to the shape input strength alone that can capture both the increase the number of yeses to test objects that
match exemplars in shape and the decrease in the number
of yeses to test objects that match exemplars in material that
children show over development.
Overall, then, these simulations suggest that our dynamic field model can capture important developmental differences in children’s noun generalization from 2 to
4 years of age with relatively modest and conceptually appealing changes to two parameters. These parameters reflect
the strength of attention to shape in naming tasks and the
amount of noise in the representations children form when
viewing the stimuli in a naming context. Thus, these changes
correspond to prior hypotheses concerning the nature of developmental change in novel noun generalization (Jones and
Smith, 1993; Samuelson, 2002; Smith, 2001; Smith and Samuelson, 2006; Smith et al., 2002) and the stability of children’s
representations (Schöner & Dineva, 2007). Together with
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the prior simulations of performance differences in forcedchoice and yes/no tasks, the DFT provides novel insights
into how knowledge is brought to bear in a moment and
how that knowledge changes over development.
5. General discussion
The goal of this paper was to examine the processes that
bring young children’s knowledge of nominal categories
to bear as they generalize novel nouns. As in prior studies,
we found that children robustly generalize novel names for
rigid objects by similarity in shape, and that this bias appears
in both forced-choice and yes/no novel noun generalization tasks (Booth et al., 2005; Landau et al., 1988). Nevertheless, we found that children generalized names for deformable things by material in a forced-choice task, but not in the
yes/no task, even though the children’s age and vocabulary size were equated across tasks, and all children saw the
same stimuli and demonstrations highlighting the material
of deformable exemplars. This task-dependent performance
when generalizing names for deformable things fits both
with prior studies of noun generalization (Gathercole & Min,
1997; Samuelson et al., 2007; Samuelson & Smith, 2000a),
and adult judgments of the similarity structure of categories
of deformable things (Samuelson and Smith, 1999; Samuelson and Smith, 2000a). The current work makes a contribution by showing how the interaction of represented knowledge and task processes can result in consistent performance
across tasks in some cases (rigid stimuli) and variable performance in others (deformable stimuli).
A dynamic field model that captured critical differences
in the decision processes in the forced-choice and yes/no
tasks provided a demonstration that processing differences
can yield behavioral differences between tasks even when
the same vocabulary knowledge is accessed. This model also
provided an excellent quantitative fit to the experimental
data from both the rigid and deformable stimulus sets. Further, the model was able to capture developmental changes
in children’s performance in the yes/no task. In this way,
then, the model provides a window onto both the real-time
processes that can produce different patterns of responses in
different task contexts, and what changes developmentally
to produce different performance at different ages (see also
Plumert, 2008).
5.1. Real-time processes
The DF model presented here is the first processed-based
model of the real-time noun generalization behaviors that
form the basis of current theories of early word learning.
As such, one key contribution of our DF model of children’s
naming behaviors comes from the real-time specification
of the processes that bring children’s knowledge of nominal categories to bear in different noun generalization tasks.
Studies of the early noun vocabulary have documented a
clear and systematic association between nominal categories of rigid things and the importance of shape for category
organization (Samuelson, 2000; Samuelson and Smith, 1999;
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Samuelson et al., 2008). These studies also suggest a more
complex relationship between nominal categories of deformable things and the importance of shape and/or material for
category organization. We contend that the more complex
relationship between category organization and naming for
deformable things allows signatures of real-time processes to
be seen in children’s noun generalizations—children generalize names for deformable things by shape in yes/no tasks,
but by material in forced-choice tasks (see also Gathercole
& Min, 1997; Samuelson et al., 2007; Samuelson & Smith,
2000a). Our DF model suggests that the key processing difference reflected in these behavioral data is grounded in the
competitive nature of the forced-choice task that allows for
direct comparison of the test objects and asks the child to
pick one object relative to the yes/no task that does not. In
the DF model, decisions in the forced-choice task are based
on which input peak wins the competition and suppresses
other competitors to enter a self-sustaining state. In contrast,
decisions in the yes/no task are based on the similarity of
each individual test object input to the exemplar; if the input is similar enough it will blend with the exemplar’s input in the decision field and will create a self-sustaining peak
(a “yes” response). The excellent fit of the simulations presented here to children’s data support our proposal regarding the differing processes at work in the two tasks. In addition, the simulations support the proposals that attention
to material is slightly stronger for categories of deformable
things, resulting in generalization by material in the forcedchoice task, but that things that match in shape are more
similar overall, resulting in generalization by shape in the
yes/no task.
This modeling work suggests that further exploration of
these real-time processes could help clarify some of the discrepancies in the literature on early noun learning. For example, Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith (2004) found that it was
not until children had 50 nouns in their productive vocabulary that they began to demonstrate a shape bias with rigid
stimuli. In contrast, Booth et al. (2005) found that 18-montholds with an average of 19 count nouns in their productive
vocabulary generalized novel names for novel rigid objects
by shape. The work presented here suggests that these differences may reflect the importance of real-time comparison processes in determining how children’s accumulated
knowledge of nominal categories manifest in the particulars of young children’s noun generalizations. GershkoffStowe and Smith (2004) used a five-item forced-choice task.
In contrast, Booth et al. (2005) used a three-item forcedchoice task that included multiple named exemplars and
vignettes describing the exemplars as artifacts. More test
objects means that children have more items to attend to
and more comparisons to make when generalizing a novel
name. In the DFT, the presentation of multiple choice items
increases competition among the choices. This would reduce the influence of the small differences in the strength of
inputs to the model that were critical to capturing the current data, and would thus lead to more chance responding
by the model (for evidence that the number of choices influences behavior in the DFT see Spencer et al. (2006)). This
suggests then, that children may be able to demonstrate a
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reliable shape bias based on weaker underlying representations of the stimuli in a three-item forced-choice task compared to a five-item forced-choice task. Likewise, the supports Booth et al. (2005) added to their task (e.g., presenting
multiple exemplars and a contrast item, and naming exemplars multiple times in vignettes) may have also helped
younger children make decisions based on weaker underlying knowledge.
Thus, this modeling work serves as a reminder that
when children acquire 50 nouns, it is not the case that a
switch flips in their head turning on a shape bias. Rather,
the behavior we call the shape bias is the emergent product
of children’s accumulating knowledge of how things are
named and the real-time processes of the task (Samuelson &
Smith, 2000b). As children acquire more and more words,
they learn more and more about the regularities inherent in
the language they are learning. For children learning English, one of these regularities is that many count nouns refer to solid things in categories organized by similarity in
shape (Gathercole and Min, 1997; Samuelson and Smith,
1999). This accumulating knowledge can serve as the basis
of novel noun generalizations and subsequent word learning as captured by the Attentional Learning Account proposed by Smith and colleagues to explain the development
and realization of the shape bias (Smith, 2000; Smith and
Samuelson, 2006; Yoshida and Smith, 2003). What the current work adds to this is a demonstration of the importance
of the real-time processes in making that connection between the child’s prior word learning history and the hereand-now of a novel word in a novel situation with novel
stimuli. In this sense, our model highlights that differences
in the specific results of individual studies are not problems, but rather, important windows onto the underlying
real-time processes that have received relatively little attention in work on early word learning.
Another key contribution of the model in this context is
that it is, to our knowledge, the first real-time process model
of the comparison processes in word learning tasks (for other
process models of comparison see, e.g. Goldstone, 1994; Larkey and Love, 2003). Based on studies in infant categorization, early word learning, and the development of analogical reasoning, a number of authors have argued recently for
the importance of comparison in cognitive processing and
early word learning (Gentner and Medina, 1998; Gentner
and Namy, 2006; Namy and Gentner, 2004; Oakes and Madole, 2003; Sandhofer, 2001). However, the nature of the comparison process in this literature has been underspecified.
The model presented here takes a first step towards greater
specification by detailing the nature of the comparison process—interaction of a set of neurons according to a local excitation/lateral inhibition function—as well as the result—a
stable peak of activation at a particular location on an ordered dimension. Further, the modeling work presented
here explicitly ties behavior in novel noun generalization
tasks to a more general theory of decision processes and a
theoretical framework—the DFT—that is grounded in neural
principles (see Simmering, Schutte, & Spencer, 2008; Spencer, Dineva, & Schöner, in press; Spencer et al., 2007). Thus,
our comparison process is neurally plausible.
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These contributions notwithstanding, it will be important in the future development of this model to incorporate
a more rigorous representation of similarity. The model presented here used a very basic notion of similarity—a single dimension where distance along that dimension captures overall similarity—akin to the use of distance metrics
in other models (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1987; Samuelson, 2002). Although the similarity structure of our inputs was well grounded in the literature, a more complete
model should include separate dimensions for particular feature dimensions such as shape, material, size, color, and so
on. Adding a more complex representation of different object properties would enable fine-grained distinctions between the relative importance of features such as rounded
corners and straight edges for rigid vs. nonrigid or nonsolid
things. Further, such a representation would allow for easier manipulation of the relative importance of such features
with changes in the nominal categories in the productive
vocabulary.
Towards this end, Faubel and Schöner (2008) have used
coupled, multi-dimensional dynamic fields in an autonomous robot that quickly learned to name 30 objects (see also
Johnson et al., 2008). Importantly, this work suggests that the
similarity structure of nominal categories—that is, the fact
that things called “banana” are more similar to each other
and to things called “squash” than they are to things called
“stapler”—is emergent from the system’s prior history of
naming, and correlations between particular names and activation of relevant feature dimensions in a given task context. Incorporating a more complex representation of similarity in our model will also require, however, corresponding
advances in our understanding of how children represent
similarity. This has been limited in the past by procedural
constraints such as the small number of trials an individual child can perform in a single experimental session. We
are currently working on a new method for eliciting similarity judgments in children that will overcome some of these
limitations.
5.2. Toward developmental process
The fact that we were able to use the same model to capture differences in children’s naming of deformable and rigid
things from 2 to 4 years of age suggests that understanding
processes at the level of individual trials can aid in understanding developmental change. The developmental simulations presented here point to two critical changes in knowledge representations over this age range: (1) an increase in
the strength of the association between naming tasks and
shape similarity and (2) a reduction in the amount of noise
in the representational states created when young children
view stimuli in these tasks. These relatively simple developmental changes are well supported in the literature. The critical insight from the model is that the complex pattern of responding we see across this age range emerges when these
two simple, quantitative and systematic developmental
changes are combined and brought to bear in a moment.
Further understanding of the complexities of performance in these tasks and over development will come from
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future work that “closes the loop” between real-time performance and development. We need to understand how
individual behaviors on the real-time scale accumulate to
create the differences in performance seen in children of
different ages and vocabulary levels. According to the Attentional Learning Account proposed by Smith and colleagues (Smith, 2001; Smith and Samuelson, 2006), biases
such as the shape bias are learned products of the child’s
experiences with language. Thus, the very early word
learning experiences of the child influence future word
learning via accumulation of regularities over multiple individual exposures to words and categories. Importantly,
the DFT provides a process by which individual experiences can build upon each other to influence the dynamics of future real-time behavior and thereby create biases.
Specifically, in their work on spatial cognition, Spencer and
colleagues (Spencer et al., 2007) have used decision fields,
similar to the ones used here, coupled to long-term memory fields (see also Faubel & Schöner, 2008). In these models, self-sustaining working memory peaks generated over
the course of individual trials leave activation traces in
long-term memory that can feed back and influence working memory (implementing a form of Hebbian learning; for
discussion, see Spencer et al., in press). This system, then,
provides a concrete process by which statistics of past decisions can accumulate over multiple individual trials and, in
turn, can be brought to bear on current behavior.
These neurally grounded models have been used to capture changes on the intermediate timescale of biases that accumulate over the course of an experiment as well as differences in children’s spatial memory abilities from 6 months to
6 years of age (see Spencer et al. (2007) for a review). For example, Hund and Spencer (2003) found that if adult participants are asked to recall three locations but one location is
responded to more often than the others, memory responses
come to be biased towards the more frequently responded
to-location. Similarly, Divena and colleagues (Dineva, 2005)
have found that infants’ trial-by-trial responses in the classic Piagetian A-not-B task impact their subsequent performance. In fact, infants who early on in the task spontaneously reach to what will be the correct location later, are
less likely to make search errors on the critical test trials.
In the DF model used to capture this finding, it is the individual decisions made on each trial that are the critical influence on long-term memory and thus subsequent behavior. We have found a similar behavioral result in recent work
on 24-month-old children’s generalizations of names for
nonsolid substances. As reported in Samuelson and Horst
(2007), these young children become less likely to generalize a novel name for a novel solid rigid object by shape if,
over the course of the experimental session, they have previously seen many nonsolid substances and solid things broken into pieces. A critical question will be whether this trialby-trial effect, like those found in previous reports that tap
spatial and sensorimotor systems, is necessarily based on the
naming decisions children make over the course of the experiment. Answering this question will have clear implications
for the nature of the process by which vocabulary statistics
accumulate to create biases. More generally, incorporating
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a coupled long-term memory system into the current model
will provide a means to further explore how the development of word learning biases might arise from individual
naming experiences.
5.3. Conclusions
The goal of the current work was to examine an issue at the
core of modern developmental science and cognitive psychology: is it useful to think of knowledge and process as
separate or must we move towards a view in which knowledge is understood in conjunction with, and relative to, the
processes that bring it to bear in a moment in a task. Our
work is clearly inspired by this second perspective which acknowledges that our only window onto knowledge is via the
behaviors we study and thus necessarily through the pane of
the processes that create those behaviors. This is clearly illustrated in the data from our first experiment in which the influence of real-time process on “knowledge” is seen in the
differing generalizations of children equal in age and vocabulary knowledge when doing different tasks. It is also clearly
seen in the modeling work presented here which demonstrates the dynamic interaction of represented knowledge
and decision processes in creating the patterns of children’s
behavior seen in specific tasks and over development. And
because we used an authentic process model that generated
individual responses on individual trials just as children do
(rather than mapping simulated activation levels onto response probabilities) the DF model presented here demonstrates the critical nature of real-time processes in children’s
individual naming behaviors.
In this respect, this work follows the lead of pioneers such
as Gibson (1969) and Thelen and Smith (1994) in examining
how far the real-time processes of the system can take us in
understanding behavior and behavioral development. Note,
however, that this is not to say that the underlying knowledge must be as limited as the representations used in the
current work. Rather, the point is that far less may be required from underlying knowledge than might have been
expected because the dynamic interaction of that knowledge
in a task in real-time is so critical in shaping behavior. Additionally, the developmental simulations presented here suggest the importance of understanding these real-time behaviors when considering the nature of developmental change.
Thus, the model points to important generalizations that can
be made about the role of comparison, stimulus similarity,
noise, and acquired knowledge in directing children’s behavior at a given point in development. However, this work
also makes clear the necessity of future work examining individual differences for a full understanding of knowledge,
behavior, and process in word learning and cognitive development more generally.
Future expansion of the model within the more general
DF framework offers the additional possibility of bridging
the gap between the real-time performance seen in our experiment, and captured in our task simulations, and the
long-term changes captured in our developmental simulations. In particular, because this model is inspired by a line
of theoretical, computational, and empirical work examining
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a range of behaviors from spatial memory, to change detection, habituation, discrimination and spatial language, it ties
children’s noun generalization behaviors to this larger picture of cognitive process. In this way, the current model provides a means to generalize insights about cognition gained
in relatively simple sensorimotor examples (like the A-not-B
task) to tasks that tap higher-level cognition, categories, and
linguistic systems. Towards this end, the current data and
model demonstrate the importance of considering behavior
in a task, and support a view of knowledge as created in the
moment from the interaction of the child’s history and realtime, task-specific dynamics.
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Appendix.
The Dynamic Field Theory is in a class of bi-stable neural networks where “on” and “off” states coexist (Amari
and Arbib, 1977; Erlhagen and Schöner, 2002; Thelen et al.,
2001). Thus, these networks can capture stable decisions—
the “on” state—as well as cases where stable decisions are not
reached—the “off” state. The continuous evolution of activation in the decision fields shown in Figure 4 is specified by a
differential equation that determines a rate of change, du(x,t)/
dt, for every activation level, u(x,t), at every field location, x,
and any moment in time, t. The basic stabilization mechanism
of the field is modeled by an inverse relationship between
the rate of change and the current level of activation, u(x,t).
This means that at high levels of activation, negative rates of
change drive activation down, while at low levels, positive
rates of change drive activation up. The activation level that
emerges is a function of the balance of different inputs and interactions in the field. For example, when a negative resting
level, h < 0, coexists with a source of excitatory input, S > 0,
then the resulting stable state of the activation dynamics:
τdu(x,t)/dt = –u(x,t) + h + S(x,t)
is u(x,t) = h + S(x,t), the level at which positive and negative
rates of change balance so that du/dt = 0. Note that τ, a parameter that fixes the time scale of the activation field, was
set to 75.2
2. We assume that one time step is roughly equivalent to 4 ms, thus
making the time between stimulus onset and response request about
2.5 s, and thus giving the model 2 s to respond (see Section 3.2.2).
One advantage of process-based models such as this one is the ability to make predictions about reaction time. Unfortunately, however, standard procedures for these tasks are not controlled enough
to obtain reaction time measurements in the young children studied
here. We are currently pursuing the development of procedures that
would overcome this limitation.
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When the rate of change of activation at a field site, x, depends not only on the activation level, u(x,t), and current inputs, S(x,t), but also on the activation levels, u(x′,t), at other
field sites, x′, then activation dynamics are interactive. Locally
excitatory/laterally inhibitory interactions are described by an
interaction function, w(x − x′), such that
w(x – x′) =

we
√2π

[ (

exp –

)]

(x – x′)2
2σw2

– wi

In the reported simulations, this interaction σw was always set
to 12.0. Only sufficiently activated sites, x′, contribute to the
interaction. This is expressed by passing activation through a
sigmoidal function:
f(u(x′,t)) = 1/(1 + exp(–βu(x′,t)))
Such threshold functions are necessarily nonlinear and are the
basis for bi-stability. For the simulations reported here β was
set to 5.0. This creates a relatively sharp threshold function
and thus allows for the strong nonlinearities needed to create
stable activation peaks (i.e., stable decisions).
Thus, the full model took the form:
τdu(x,t)/dt = –u(x,t) + h + κS(x,t) + ∫ dx′ w(x – x′) f(u(x′,t))

where κ was a general gain factor that modulated the strength
of the input, S(x,t).
Inputs to the model took the form of Gaussians represented
by the following equation:

[

S(x, t) = A exp –

(x – xc )2
2σ2

]

where A is the amplitude or strength of the input, xc is the central position of the input along the similarity dimension, and
σ determines the precision of the input. The specific inputs to
the model varied depending on the task and the stimulus set.
For the forced-choice task, the exemplar and both the shapematching and material-matching test objects were all presented at once. Thus, the input equation for this task was:
SFC(x,t) = SExemplar(x,t) + SShape(x,t) + SMaterial(x,t)
In the yes/no task, each test object was presented individually
with the exemplar. Thus, for one trial of this task the equation
was:
SYN_1(x,t) = SExemplar(x,t) + SShape(x,t)
and for the other it was:
SYN_2(x,t) = SExemplar(x,t) + SMaterial(x,t)
The stimuli for the deformable and rigid sets varied in the
strength, precision, and location of the test objects (the exemplar was always in the same location). Details of these stimulus sets are discussed below.
Noise was added to the model using fluctuating amplitudes for all inputs. This introduces a form of spatially correlated noise that is consistent with neural principles (Dineva,
2005; Schutte et al., 2003). Thus, the generic equation for the inputs including noise was:

[

S(x, t) = A + q ξ(t)) exp –

(x – xc)2
2σ2

]
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The noise strength, q, was set to .05 for all simulations. ξ was a
normally distributed random number. Different random numbers were selected at each time step and for each component of
the input (e.g., shape-matching test object vs. material-matching test object) independently.

References
Amari and Arbib, 1977 ◄ S. Amari and M. A. Arbib, Competition and
cooperation in neural nets. In: J. Metzler, Editor, Systems neuroscience, Academic Press (1977).
Barsalou, 1999 ◄ L. W. Barsalou, Perceptual symbol systems, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1999), pp. 577–600.
Bastian et al., 1998 ◄ A. Bastian, A. Riehle, W. Erlhagen, and G.
Schöner, Prior information preshapes the population representation of movement direction in motor cortex, NeuroReport 9 (1998),
pp. 315–319.
Bastian et al., 2003 ◄ A. Bastian, G. Schöner, and A. Riehle, Preshaping and continuous evolution of motor cortical representations
during movement preparation, European Journal of Neuroscience 18
(2003), pp. 2047–2058.
Berthier et al., 2000 ◄ N. E. Berthier, S. DeBlois, C. R. Poirier, J. A. Novak, and R. K. Clifton, Where’s the ball? Two- and three-year-olds
reason about unseen events, Developmental Psychology 36 (2000),
pp. 394–401.
Bloom, 2000 ◄ P. Bloom, How children learn the meanings of words,
The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2000).
Bloom and Markson, 1998 ◄ P. Bloom and L. Markson, Intention and
analogy in children’s naming of pictorial representations, Psychological Science 9 (3) (1998), pp. 200–204.
Booth and Waxman, 2002 ◄ A. E. Booth and S. R. Waxman, Word learning is ‘smart’: Evidence that conceptual information affects preschoolers’ extension of novel words, Cognition 84 (2002), pp. B11–B22.
Booth et al., 2005 ◄ A. E. Booth, S. R. Waxman, and Y. T. Huang, Conceptual information permeates word learning in infancy, Developmental Psychology 41 (3) (2005), pp. 491–505.
Clearfield et al., 2006 ◄ M. W. Clearfield, F. J. Diedrich, L. B. Smith,
and E. Thelen, Young infants reach correctly in A-not-B tasks: On
the development of stability and perseveration, Infant Behavior and
Development 29 (2006), pp. 435–444.
Colunga and Smith, 2008 ◄ E. Colunga and L. B. Smith, Knowledge
embedded in process: The self-organization of skilled noun learning, Developmental Science 11 (2008), pp. 195–203.
Desimone and Duncan, 1995 ◄ R. Desimone and J. Duncan, Neural
mechanisms of selective visual attention, Annual Review of Neuroscience 18 (1995), pp. 193–222.
Diedrich et al., 2001 ◄ F. J. Diedrich, T. Highlands, E. Thelen, and L.
B. Smith, The role of target distinctiveness in infant perseverative
reaching errors, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 78 (2001),
pp. 263–290.
Diedrich et al., 2000 ◄ F. J. Diedrich, E. Thelen, L. B. Smith, and D.
Corbetta, Motor memory is a factor in infant perseverative error,
Developmental Science 3 (2000), pp. 479–494.
Diesendruck and Bloom, 2003 ◄ G. Diesendruck and P. Bloom, How
specific is the shape bias?, Child Development 74 (1) (2003), pp.
168–178.
Dineva, 2005 ◄ E. Dineva, Dynamical field theory of infant reaching
and its dependence on behavioral history and context, Institue für
Neuroinformatik and International Graduate School for Neuroscience, Bochum, Germany (2005).
Durstewitz et al., 2000 ◄ D. Durstewitz, J. K. Seamans, and T. J. Sejnowski, Neurocomputational models of working memory, Nature
3 (2000), pp. 1184–1191.
Erlhagen and Schöner, 2002 ◄ W. Erlhagen and G. Schöner, Dynamic
field theory of movement preparation, Psychological Review 109
(2002), pp. 545–572.
Faubel and Schöner, 2008 ◄ C. Faubel and G. Schöner, Learning to
recognize objects on the fly: A neurally based dynamic field approach, Neural Networks 21 (2008), pp. 562–576.
Fenson et al., 1994 ◄ L. Fenson, P. S. Dale, J. S. Reznick, E. Bates, D.
Thal, et al. (1994). Variability in early communicative development, 59(5, Serial No. 5).

samuelson, schutte,

&

horst in cognition

110 (2009)

Freeman, 2001 ◄ W. J. Freeman, The behavior–cognition link is well
done: The cognition–brain link needs more work, Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 24 (2001), pp. 42–43.
Gathercole et al., 1995 ◄ V. C. Gathercole, L. Cramer, S. C. Somerville, and M. J. o. d. Haar, Ontological categories and function:
Acquisition of new names, Cognitive Development 10 (1995), pp.
225–251.
Gathercole and Min, 1997 ◄ V. C. Gathercole and H. Min, Word
meaning biases or language-specific effects? Evidence from English, Spanish and Korean, First Language 17 (1997), pp. 31–56.
Gathercole and Whitfield, 2001 ◄ V. C. Gathercole and L. C. Whitfield, Function as a criterion for the extension of new words, Journal of Child Language 28 (2001), pp. 87–125.
Gentner and Medina, 1998 ◄ D. Gentner and J. Medina, Similarity
and the development of rules, Cognition 65 (1998), pp. 263–297.
Gentner and Namy, 2006 ◄ D. Gentner and L. L. Namy, Analogical
processes in language learning, Current Directions in Psychological
Science 15 (6) (2006), pp. 297–301.
Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith, 2004 ◄ L. Gershkoff-Stowe and L. B.
Smith, Shape and the first hundred nouns, Child Development 74 (4)
(2004), pp. 1098–1114.
Gibson, 1969 ◄ E. J. Gibson, Principles of perceptual learning and development, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ (1969).
Glenberg et al., 2001 ◄ A. M. Glenberg, M. R. Cowart, and M. P. Kaschak, An affordance field for guiding movement and cognition,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2001), pp. 43–44.
Goldstone, 1994 ◄ R. L. Goldstone, Similarity, interactive activation,
and mapping, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition 20 (1994), pp. 3–28.
Hund and Spencer, 2003 ◄ A. M. Hund and J. P. Spencer, Developmental changes in the relative weighting of geometric and experience-dependent location cues, Journal of Cognition and Development
4 (2003), pp. 3–38.
Imai et al., 1994 ◄ M. Imai, D. Gentner, and N. Uchida, Children’s
theories of word meaning: The role of shape similarity in early acquisition, Cognitive Development 9 (1) (1994), pp. 45–75.
Jancke et al., 1999 ◄ D. Jancke, W. Erlhagen, H. R. Dinse, A. C. Akhavan, M. Giese, and A. Steinhage et al., Parametric population representation of retinal location: Neuronal interaction dynamics in
cat primary visual cortex, Journal of Neuroscience 19 (1999), pp.
9016–9028.
Johnson et al., 2008 ◄ J. S. Johnson, J. P. Spencer, and G. Schöner, G.
Moving to higher ground: The dynamic field theory and the dynamics of visual cognition. In F. Garzón, A. Laakso, & T. Gomila
(Eds.), Dynamics and psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 26, 227–
251 (Special issue; 2008).
Jones and Smith, 1993 ◄ S. S. Jones and L. B. Smith, The place of perception in children’s concepts, Cognitive Development 8 (1993), pp.
113–139.
Kruschke, 1992 ◄ J. K. Kruschke, ALCOVE: An exemplar-based connectionist model of category learning, Psychological Review 99 (1)
(1992), pp. 22–44.
Landau et al., 1988 ◄ B. Landau, L. B. Smith, and S. S. Jones, The importance of shape in early lexical learning, Cognitive Development 3
(1988), pp. 299–321.
Landau et al., 1998 ◄ B. Landau, L. B. Smith, and S. S. Jones, Object
shape, object function and object name, Journal of Memory and Language 38 (1998), pp. 1–27.
Larkey and Love, 2003 ◄ L. B. Larkey and B. C. Love, CAB: Connectionist analogy builder, Cognitive Science 27 (2003), pp. 781–794.
Luce, 1963 ◄ R. D. Luce, Detection and recognition. In: R. D. Luce, R.
R. Bush and G. Eugene, Editors, Handbook of mathematical psychology, Wiley, New York (1963).
Markman, 2001 ◄ A. B. Markman, Are dynamical systems the answer, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2001), pp. 50–51.
Mix et al., 1996 ◄ K. S. Mix, J. Huttenlocher, and S. C. Levine, Do preschool children recognize auditory–visual numerical correspondences?, Child Development 67 (1996), pp. 1592–1608.
Munakata and McClelland, 2003 ◄ Y. Munakata and J. L. McClelland, Connectionist models of development, Developmental Science
6 (2003), pp. 413–429.
Namy and Gentner, 2004 ◄ L. L. Namy and D. Gentner, The role of
comparison in children’s early word learning. In: D. G. Hall and S.
S. Waxman, Editors, Weaving a lexicon, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
(2004), pp. 533–568.

a dynamic field model of children’s novel noun generalization

Nosofsky, 1987 ◄ R. M. Nosofsky, Attention and learning processes
in the identification and categorization of integral stimuli, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 13
(1987), pp. 87–108.
Oakes and Madole, 2003 ◄ L. M. Oakes and K. L. Madole, Principles
of developmental change in infants’ category formation. In: D. H.
Rakison and L. M. Oakes, Editors, Early category and concept development: Making sense of the blooming, buzzing confusion, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2003), pp. 132–158.
Plumert, 2008 ◄ J. M. Plumert, Children’s thinking is not just about
what’s in the head: Understanding the organism and environment
as a unified system. In: R. V. Kail, Editor, Advances in child development and behavior, Academic Press, San Diego, CA (2008), pp.
373–417.
Port and VanGelder, 1995 ◄ R. Port and T. VanGelder, Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition, MIT/Bradford,
Cambridge, MA (1995).
Samuelson, 2000 ◄ Samuelson, L. K. (2000). Statistical regularities in
vocabulary guide language acquisition in 15–20-month-olds and connectionist models. Unpublished Dissertation. Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University.
Samuelson, 2002 ◄ L. K. Samuelson, Statistical regularities in vocabulary guide language acquisition in connectionist models and
15–20-month-olds, Developmental Psychology 38 (6) (2002), pp.
1016–1037.
Samuelson and Bloom, 2008 ◄ L. K. Samuelson and P. Bloom, eds.
(2008). What counts as an explanation of development: The shape
bias as a case study (special section). Developmental Science, 11,
183–222.
Samuelson and Horst, 2007 ◄ L. K. Samuelson and J. S. Horst, Dynamic noun generalization: Moment-to-moment interactions
shape children’s naming biases, Infancy 11 (1) (2007), pp. 97–110.
Samuelson and Horst, 2008 ◄ L. K. Samuelson and J. S. Horst,
Confronting complexity: Insights from the details of behavior
over multiple timescales, Developmental Science 11 (2008), pp.
209–215.
Samuelson et al., 2008 ◄ L. K. Samuelson, J. S. Horst, A. R. Schutte,
and B. N. Dobbertin, Rigid thinking about deformables: Do children sometimes overgeneralize the shape bias, Journal of Child Language 35 (2008), pp. 559–589.
Samuelson and Smith, 1999 ◄ L. K. Samuelson and L. B. Smith, Early
noun vocabularies: Do ontology, category organization and syntax correspond?, Cognition 73 (1) (1999), pp. 1–33.
Samuelson and Smith, 2000a ◄ L. K. Samuelson and L. B. Smith,
Children’s attention to rigid and deformable shape in naming and
non-naming tasks, Child Development 71 (6) (2000), pp. 1555–1570.
Samuelson and Smith, 2000b ◄ L. K. Samuelson and L. B. Smith,
Grounding development in cognitive processes, Child Development
71 (2000), pp. 98–106.
Sandhofer, 2001 ◄ C. Sandhofer, Structure in parents’ input: Effects
of categorization versus comparison. In: A. H. Do, L. Dominguez
and A. Johansen, Editors, Proceedings of the 25th annual Boston University conference on language development Vol. 2, Cascadilla Press,
Sommerville, MA (2001), pp. 657–667.
Schöner and Dineva, 2007 ◄ G. Schöner and E. Dineva, Dynamic instabilities as mechanisms for emergence, Developmental Science 10
(2007), pp. 69–74.
Schutte and Spencer, in press ◄ A. R. Schutte and J. P. Spencer, Tests
of the dynamic field theory and the spatial precision hypothesis:
A developmental transition in spatial working memory. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance (in
press).
Schutte et al., 2003 ◄ A. R. Schutte, J. P. Spencer, and G. Schöner,
Testing the dynamic field theory: Working memory for locations
becomes more spatially precise over development, Child Development 74 (5) (2003), pp. 1393–1417.
Simmering et al., 2008 ◄ V. R. Simmering, A. R. Schutte, and J. P.
Spencer, Generalizing the dynamic field theory of spatial working
memory across real and developmental time scales. In S. Becker
(Ed.), Computational cognitive neuroscience. Brain Research, 1202, 68–
86 (special issue; 2008).
Simmering et al., 2006 ◄ V. R. Simmering, J. P. Spencer, and G.
Schöner, Reference-related inhibition produces enhanced position
discrimination and fast repulsion near axes of symmetry, Perception and Psychophysics 63 (2006), pp. 1027–1046.

345

Skarda and Freeman, 1987 ◄ C. A. Skarda and W. J. Freeman, How
brains make chaos in order to make sense of the world, Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 10 (2) (1987), pp. 161–195.
Smith, 2000 ◄ L. B. Smith, Learning how to learn words: an associative crane. In: R. M. Golinkoff and K. Hersh-Pasek, Editors, Becoming a word learner. A debate on lexical acquisition, Oxford University
Press, New York (2000), pp. 51–80.
Smith, 2001 ◄ L. B. Smith, How domain-general processes my create
domain-specific biases. In: M. Bowerman and S. Levinson, Editors,
Language acquisition and conceptual development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA (2001), pp. 101–131.
Smith et al., 1992 ◄ L. B. Smith, S. S. Jones, and B. Landau, Count
nouns, adjectives, and perceptual properties in children’s novel
word interpretations, Developmental Psychology 28 (2) (1992), pp.
273–286.
Smith et al., 2002 ◄ L. B. Smith, S. S. Jones, B. Landau, L. GershkoffStowe, and L. K. Samuelson, Object name learning provides onthe-job training for attention, Psychological Science 13 (1) (2002), pp.
13–19.
Smith et al., 2003 ◄ L. B. Smith, S. Jones, H. Yoshida, and E. Colunga,
Whose DAM account? Attentional learning explains Booth and
Waxman, Cognition 87 (2003), pp. 209–213.
Smith et al., 1999 ◄ L. B. Smith, E. Thelen, R. Titzer, and D. McLin,
Knowing in the context of acting: The task dynamics of the A-notB error, Psychological Review 106 (2) (1999), pp. 235–260.
Smith and Samuelson, 2006 ◄ L. B. Smith and L. K. Samuelson, An
attentional learning account of the shape bias: Reply to Cimpian
& Markman (2005) and Booth, Waxman & Huang (2005), Developmental Psychology 42 (6) (2006), pp. 1339–1343.
Sophian, 1997 ◄ C. Sophian, Beyond competence: The significance of
performance of conceptual development, Cognitive Development 12
(1997), pp. 281–303.
Spelke et al., 1992 ◄ E. S. Spelke, K. Breinlinger, J. Macomber, and K.
Jacobson, Origins of knowledge, Psychological Review 99 (4) (1992),
pp. 605–632.
Spencer et al., 2007 ◄ J. P. Spencer, V. R. Simmering, A. R. Schutte,
and G. Schöner, What does theoretical neuroscience have to offer the study of behavioral development? Insights from a dynamic
field theory of spatial cognition. In: J. M. Plumert and J. P. Spencer, Editors, The Emerging Spatial Mind, Oxford University Press,
Oxford (2007), pp. 321–361.
Spencer et al., in press ◄ J. P. Spencer, E. Dineva, and G. Schöner,
Moving toward a grand theory while valuing the importance of
the initial conditions. In J. P. Spencer, M. S. Thomas, & J. L. McClelland (Eds.), Toward a unified theory of development: Connectionism and dynamic systems theory re-considered. New York: Oxford
University Press (in press).
Spencer and Schöner, 2003 ◄ J. P. Spencer and G. Schöner, Bridging
the representational gap in the dynamic systems approach to development, Developmental Science 6 (2003), pp. 392–412.
Spencer et al., 2006 ◄ J. P. Spencer, V. R. Simmering, and A. R.
Schutte, Towards a formal theory of flexible spatial behavior: Geometric category biases generalize across pointing and verbal response types, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance 32 (2) (2006), pp. 473–490.
Spivey and Dale, 2006 ◄ M. J. Spivey and R. Dale, Continuous dynamics in real-time cognition, Current Directions in Psychological
Science 15 (2006), pp. 207–211.
Starkey et al., 1990 ◄ P. Starkey, E. S. Spelke, and R. Gelman, Numerical abstraction by human infants, Cognition 36 (1990), pp. 97–128.
Thelen et al., 2001 ◄ E. Thelen, G. Schöner, C. Scheier, and L. B.
Smith, The dynamics of embodiment: A field theory of infant perseverative reaching, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 24 (2001), pp.
1–86.
Thelen and Smith, 1994 ◄ E. Thelen and L. B. Smith, A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action, MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA (1994).
Thelen and Smith, 1997 ◄ E. Thelen and L. B. Smith, Dynamic systems theories (5th ed.). In: D. Khun and R. Seigler, Editors, Theoretical models of human development. Volume 1 of the Handbook of child
psychology Vol. 1, Wiley, New York (1997), pp. 563–634.
Yoshida and Smith, 2003 ◄ H. Yoshida and L. B. Smith, Shifting ontological boundaries: How Japanese- and English-speaking children
generalize names for animals and artifacts, Developmental Science 6
(1) (2003), pp. 1–17.

